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Regulating Financial Conglomerates
Abstract
We investigate the optimal regulation of financial conglomerates which combine
a bank and a non-bank financial institution. The conglomerate’s risk-taking in-
centives depend upon the level of market discipline it faces, which in turn is
determined by the conglomerate’s liability strucure. We examine optimal capi-
tal requirements for standalone institutions, for integrated financial conglomer-
ates, and for financial conglomerates that are structured as holding companies.
For a given risk profile, integrated conglomerates have a lower probability of
failure than either their standalone or decentralised equivalent. However, when
risk profiles are endogenously selected conglomeration may extend the reach
of the deposit insurance safety net and hence provide incentives for increased
risk-taking. As a result, integrated conglomerates may optimally attract higher
capital requirements. In contrast, decentralised conglomerates are able to hold
assets in the socially most eﬃcient place. Their optimal capital requirements
encourage this. Hence, the practice of “regulatory arbitrage”, or of transfering
assets from one balance sheet to another, is welfare-increasing. We discuss the
policy implications of our finding in the context not only of the present debate
on the regulation of financial conglomerates but also in the light of existing
US bank holding company regulation.
KEY WORDS: Financial conglomerate, capital regulation, regulatory arbi-
trage.
JEL Classification: G21, G22, G28.
REGULATION OF FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES
1. Introduction
The emergence of financial conglomerates is one of the major financial developments of recent
years.1 Financial conglomerates are institutions which provide under a single corporate umbrella
banking, insurance and other financial products. Conglomeration has been motivated by cost
advantages from economies of scale and scope in insurance sales and securities underwriting, and
by the perceived advantages of risk diversification.2 In this paper, we examine the optimal capital
regulation of financial conglomerates.
We analyse the extent to which risk-taking incentives in conglomerates and their optimal cap-
ital regulation are aﬀected by organizational form. Dierick (2004) and Shull and White (1998)
discuss the eﬀect of the diﬀerent legal structures available to conglomerates. Although the choice
of legal structure may be restricted by regulation,3 it is essentially a choice between structuring the
conglomerate as an integrated entity subject to a unique liability constraint, or structuring it as a
holding company and allowing its various divisions to fail independently. For example, universal
banks are structured as integrated entities and carry on the same activities as bank holding com-
panies. The conglomerate’s capital regulation is constrained by its organizational form. Integrated
entities face a single capital requirement, while the regulator can set separate capital requirements
for each division of a decentralized conglomerate.
Integrated conglomerates achieve inter-divisional diversification (see Malkönen, 2004, and Allen
and Jagtiani, 2000). Practitioners have argued conglomerate diversification will reduce bankruptcy
risk and therefore that it should be rewarded with reduced capital requirements (see Oliver, Wyman
& Co., 2001). Although perfectly correct, this argument, and the empirical work upon which it
rests, ignores entirely the fact that financial institutions select the riskiness of their portfolios in
response to their institutional environment.
The process of transferring assets between conglomerate divisions in order to avoid high capital
charges is popularly referred to as regulatory, or capital, arbitrage. Regulators usually regard
capital arbitrage as a risk of conglomeration: see for example Dierick (2004). The Joint Forum
(2001) provide an extensive discussion of regulatory arbitrage and are ambivalent as to its eﬀects,
concluding that it must be accompanied by evidence of adequate risk management practices.4 In
fact, we show that capital arbitrage increases welfare by increasing market discipline. This eﬀect
1The November 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act dismantled legal barriers to the integration of financial services
firms which had been erected by the 1933 passage of the Glass-Stegall Act. Its passage made conglomeration legal
in the United States. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley act was a response to market forces which had already resulted in
the Federal Reserve Board’s approval in 1998 of the merger of Citicorp and Travelers. Conglomeration in Europe,
which was subject to fewer regulatory hurdles, followed the same trend: between 1985 and 1999 the value of merger
and acquisition deals involving a commercial bank and an insurance company was $89.6 billion, or 11.6% of all
acquisitions by European financial institutions. See Lown, Osler, Strahan, and Sufi (2000) for detailed discussion
about, and statistics concerning, the development of the European bancassurance market. A detailed discussion of
conglomeration experience in the Benelux countries is provided by the National Bank of Belgium (2002).
2For a detailed discussion for the rationale behind conglomeration, see Berger, DeYoung, Genay, and Udell (2000),
Milbourn, Boot, and Thakor (1999) and Dierick (2004). Santos (1998) discusses mergers between banks and insurance
firms.
3Within Europe, it is illegal to combine insurance with banking, securities or any other commercial business in
the same legal entity (Dierick, 2004, p. 17: see Article 6(1)(b) of the Life Asssurance Directive and Article 81(b) of
the Non-Life Assurance Directive).
4Loss transfer from a sound conglomerate division to a divison close to financial distress is a distinct issue which
regulators can deal with, subject to the passage of the necessary legislation.
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is further strengthened to the extent that insurance companies have a lower social cost of failure
than banks.
The intuition for our results is as follows. Capital requirements force financial institutions
to internalise costs which they would otherwise ignore. They should therefore reflect the fact
that risk levels are selected endogenously. Banks have privileged access to deposit insurance,
whose risk insensitive price biases them towards socially excessive risk-taking. Since this reduces
the eﬀectiveness of market discipline for banks, the appropriate response is to raise the capital
requirement to which they are subject. In contrast, institutions such as insurance companies which
are financed entirely by investors who charge a fair price for the risk to which they are exposed
are subject to greater market discipline, and hence can be given a lower regulatory capital charge.
In summary, pillar one (capital requirements) and pillar three (market discipline) of the new Basle
Accord are substitutes.
In an integrated conglomerate, part of the funding is provided by risk-insensitive insured de-
positors. This reduces market discipline relative to a standalone non-bank institution. Depending
upon the benefits derived from diversification, this reduction in market discipline may even justify
higher capital requirements for the conglomerate than for its stand alone constituents. In contrast,
each division of a holding company is subject to a locally eﬃcient level of capital. If regulatory
arbitrage is permitted, capital requirements can be set so as to induce the holding company to
select and to allocate projects eﬃciently.
We develop this argument in a model in which banks diﬀer from other financial institutions in
two ways. First, their assets are opaque, which makes it impossible to assess the extent of their risk;
second, their liability holders are unsophisticated small depositors who not only have limited ability
and incentives to assess the financial state of their bank, but also are largely covered by a deposit
insurance safety net. We also assume that there is a social cost of financial institution failure.
The costs of these eﬀects are ignored by bank shareholders and hence result in overinvestment in
risky projects. The role of capital requirements is to force shareholders (and hence managers) to
internalize these eﬀects. This comes at a price: as in Myers and Majluf (1984) and Bolton and
Freixas (2000), we assume that capital is exogenously costly as a result of informational frictions.
Managers therefore react to capital requirements by raising their hurdle rate for new investments.
The optimal capital requirement trades oﬀ these over- and under- investment eﬀects.
In our framework, market financed institutions such as insurance companies are subject to
market discipline. As a result they do not overinvest and hence it is socially optimal to impose a
zero capital requirement since this will cause them to take socially optimal investment decisions. In
contrast, deposit insurance premia do not fully reflect the bank’s risk position.5 As a result their
cost of funds is risk-insensitive. Capital requirements force them to account for the social costs of
deposit insurance and hence they face a positive capital requirement.
We analyze decentralized, or holding company, and integrated conglomerates, consisting of a
bank and a market-financed institution such as an insurance company. We assume that there are
no informational or agency problems within a conglomerate, which aims simply to maximize its
total value. As a result, the conglomerate will be indiﬀerent as to where positive NPV projects are
5See Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) for evidence of flat deposit insurance rates around the world.
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held.
With the above assumption, we show that the social first best can be achieved in holding
company conglomerates by setting a capital requirement of zero for the market-financed division,
and setting very high capital requirements for the bank. In this case, the bank avoids its high cost
of capital by transferring its assets to the market-financed division, which will accept all positive
net present value investments.
The transfer of assets corresponds precisely to regulatory arbitrage. Hence, in contrast with
commonly received opinion, regulatory arbitrage in our model has three unambiguously positive
eﬀects. First, the investment distortions induced by the deposit insurance fund will no longer occur.
Second, marginal projects in which the standalone bank would not invest will now attract funds,
because of the lower capital requirement. Third, assets are transferred to an institution with lower
social costs of failure. Regulatory arbitrage therefore reduces the extent of the safety net and, by
allowing for a more eﬃcient use of capital, results in a greater degree of bank credit extension.
Under an integrated structure, the various operating units of the conglomerate are compelled to
bail one another out. Losses in one division may therefore be covered by profits in another. However,
in integrated conglomerates the eﬀects of market discipline are attenuated by the extension of the
deposit insurance safety net to the entire institution. As a result, we show that whenever possible,
the conglomerate will assume so much risk that the failure of one division will result in the insolvency
of the entire conglomerate. Integrated conglomerates may therefore open new channels for financial
contagion. In contrast to the diversification hypothesis advanced above, we show that, for certain
parameter values, integrated conglomerates may require a capital requirement which exceeds the
sum of the constituent standalone division requirements.
Although we derive our results in a simple framework in which each institution eﬀectively
manages a single scaleable project, we believe that our intuition is robust to alternative set-ups.
For example, a reasonable alternative framework would be one in which risk-averse bankers selected
their investment portfolios according to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (see Hart and Jaﬀee, 1974).
Our work demonstrates that the diversification benefits of financial conglomeration may be
overturned simply by allowing for the endogeneity of risk levels in financial institutions. A similar
point is made by Boot and Schmeits (2000), in a model of conglomeration without deposit insur-
ance. In their paper, market discipline is reduced because diversification reduces the sensitivity
of aggregrate cashflows to divisional investment decisions. Unlike us, Boot and Schmeits are not
concerned with capital regulation.
We conclude from the above discussion that, contrary to the majority view, holding company
conglomerates allow for a more eﬃcient allocation of resources than integrated ones. Our analysis is
therefore supportive of existing legislative restrictions upon the integration of banking and insurance
activities (see footnote 3), provided capital arbitrage is permitted.
In section 2 we present a model of standalone financial intermediaries and derive optimal capital
requirements. Section 3 extends our analysis to holding-company and integrated conglomerates.
Section 4 discusses the robustness of our results. Section 5 discusses the implications of our results
for regulatory policy and section 6 concludes.
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2. Standalone Financial Intermediaries
In this section we analyze a one period interaction between a regulator, a financial intermediary,
and the investors in the intermediary. The game which we study is illustrated in figure 1. At time 0
the regulator sets a capital requirement C. At time 1 nature presents a project to the intermediary
which requires an investment of $1 and which has expected return R, where R is drawn from
[Rl, Rh] according to the uniform distribution. We write ∆ ≡ Rh − Rl. The intermediary decides
at time 2 whether or not to invest. If investment occurs, he must select the riskiness B ∈
©
0, B¯
ª
of the project. If the intermediary selects B = B¯ then we say that he is “playing risky;” otherwise,
we will say that he is “playing safe.” Projects return R+B or R−B, each with probability 12 . If
the intermediary decides to invest then he must raise the $1 investment at time 3. He raises $C of
capital and $ (1− C) from investors. At time 4 the project’s returns realize and are distributed to
the investors.
Regulator
announces 
capital
requirement
C
Nature
reveals
expected
project return,
R
If investment
occurs,
intermediary
selects riskiness
B∈{0,B}
Fund-raising
occurs
Returns
realise
time 0 time 1 time 2 time 3 time 4
Figure 1: Time line for the operation of the standalone intermediary.
We assume that outside capital has an exogenous cost. This is in line with statements by prac-
titioners and can be justified with respect to signalling stories à la Myers and Majluf. Specifically,
we assume that the cost to the intermediary of raising an amount C of capital is Cκ for some κ > 0.
Since κ is a pure wealth transfer it will not feature directly in our welfare calculations, although it
will have an indirect impact upon welfare through its impact upon investment incentives.
We consider two types of financial intermediaries: Deposit-Financed Intermediaries, which we
will also refer to as DFIs or as banks; and Market-Financed Intermediaries, or MFIs. The MFIs
within financial conglomerates are either insurance or securities firms. Financial intermediaries
are subject to regulation which attempts to maximise the expected present value of investments,
net of the social costs of failure. Regulators therefore ignore wealth transfers. They set capital
requirements and, when appropriate, provide deposit insurance. They are constrained to base
regulations upon hard data which are verifable by the courts. In particular, we assume that this
means that the risk measurements used by the regulator are coarser than those available to an
informed investor, who can base her investment decisions upon soft as well as hard information.
As a result, depository institutions have privileged access to risk-insensitive funds. For the sake of
simplicity we abstract from the details and assume that deposit insurance premia are zero. Any
flat but non-zero deposit insurance premium would complicate our presentation without materially
aﬀecting our results.
The investors in banks, to whom we refer as depositors, are protected by a deposit insurance
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fund which will make good any losses which they experience. As a result their willingness to invest is
independent of their bank’s investment choices. The investors in MFIs do not have deposit insurance
and so condition their willingness to pay upon the riskiness of their intermediary’s investment
choices. For convenience we will sometimes refer to MFI investors as bond-holders.
All of the players in our model are risk neutral.
We assume that the intermediary has a private cost ζ ≥ 0 of bankruptcy. We interpret ζ
as representing the intermediary’s charter value: it is clearly a function of policy choices such as
competition levels, but in our model we leave it as an exogenous variable. Finally, we assume that
intermediary failure has a social cost φ > 0. When the intermediary is a bank, φ includes such
exogenous factors as the impact of the bank’s failure upon the payment system, and the costs of
destroying informational assets which have a value in the relationship with the bank’s clients.6 We
assume that the social failure cost φ includes any social eﬀects which the intermediary cares about.
Hence we include φ in our welfare calculations, but not ζ.
We define a fragile intermediary to be one which with non-zero probability will fail and we say
that such an intermediary is assuming systemic risk. A sound intermediary is one which will never
fail. The decision to run a fragile intermediary is endogenous.
We now compute the respective optimal capital requirements C∗M and C
∗
D for market- and
deposit- financed intermediaries.
2.1. Market-Financed Intermediaries
To determine the optimal time 0 capital requirement C∗M for a MFI, we solve our model by backward
induction, starting with the MFI’s time 2 investment decision.
Firstly, we characterize the contract which the MFI writes with its bond-holders. Let ρ be the
quantity which the MFI promises to repay them. The bond-holders have priority in the event of
project failure and we assume that there are no costs of bankruptcy.
Suppose that the regulator has set a capital requirement C. The intermediary will be fragile
precisely when condition (1) is satisfied, so that it will fail in the event that the project returns
R−B:
R−B < ρ. (1)
Recall that B is a choice variable and hence that fragility is an endogenous intermediary charac-
teristic.
We assume that at time 3, the bond-holders are able perfectly to observe both R and B. Since
they are risk-neutral it follows that the MFI’s promised payment ρ must satisfy
ρ = ρS ≡ 1− C
when the intermediary is sound, and 12ρ+
1
2
¡
R− B¯
¢
= 1− C, or
ρ = ρF ≡ 2 (1− C)−R+ B¯
6See James (1991) for an estimation of the cost of bank failure, and Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1993) for the
estimation of the cost of Continental Illinois bankruptcy to its clients.
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when the intermediary is fragile.
The expected profit of a sound MFI is
πS (C) ≡
1
2
(R+B − ρS) +
1
2
(R−B − ρS)− C (1 + κ) = R− (1 + Cκ) , (2)
which yields the following individual rationality constraint for sound MFIs:
R ≥ RS (C) ≡ 1 + Cκ. (SIR)
The expected profit of a fragile MFI is
πM,F (C) ≡
1
2
(R+B − ρF ) +
1
2
ζ − C (1 + κ)
= R− (1 + Cκ)− 1
2
ζ.
Since πM,F < πM,S it follows immediately that the MFI will never choose to be fragile. This
observation follows immediately from the second Modigliani-Miller proposition (1958): provided
perfectly informed debt holders are able precisely to price the debt, the eﬀect of additional risk tak-
ing by the manager is completely reflected in the additional cost of debt. Consequently, additional
risk-taking cannot transfer wealth from debt to equity holders.
Notice that the strict inequality (πM,F < πM,S) obtains because the manager faces a private
cost of bankruptcy. We justify this cost with reference to managerial loss of reputation in the
event of bankruptcy. We do not explore here the alternative possibility that the manager might
be induced to take risks by his compensation schedule. When debt-holders can correctly price risk
such a schedule, based for example upon stock options, would in any case be suboptimal.
The MFI will therefore select any investment whose return exceeds RS (C). Figure 2 illustrates
the standalone MFI’s investment choices as a function of C and R: for a given C, the MFI will
accept any investment with expected return in excess of 1 + Cκ, and will select B so as to ensure
that the intermediary is sound, as indicated on the figure by the script S.
Proposition 1, whose proof is immediate from figure 2, states that market discipline will induce
market-financed intermediaries to adopt a first-best investment strategy in the absence of capital
regulation.
Proposition 1 When capital is set in accordance with equation (3) the intermediary accepts all
projects for which R ≥ 1 and is always sound.
C∗M = 0. (3)
2.2. Deposit-Financed Intermediaries
In this section we examine the optimal capital regulation of a deposit-financed intermediary. As
discussed above, the risk measurements which the regulator can use in setting capital requirements
are coarser than those which the bond-holders in a MFI use when establishing a fair price for their
investments. We incorporate this requirement into our model by assuming that capital requirements
can distinguish only between investment and non-investment. In the latter case the depositors’
7
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R
C
S
hR
1
lR
0
( ) κCCRS +=1
Figure 2: Investment choices for a standalone market-financed intermediary.
funds are entirely cash-collateralised and it is clearly optimal to set the capital requirement equal
to zero. In the former case the banker could make any investment in [Rl, Rh]×
©
0, B¯
ª
and so the
capital requirement in our model is risk-insensitive. We do not think that our qualitative findings
would be aﬀected if the regulator could use a finer partition of the investment space provided it
remained coarser than that used by the market, but introducing such a partition into our model
would involve needless complexity.
Note that, because the DFI’s depositors are protected by deposit insurance, the DFI need only
promise to repay 1− C. A bank is therefore fragile precisely when
R−B < 1−C, (4)
and is otherwise sound.
The expected return to a sound bank is again given by πS (C), and the sound banking IR
constraint is therefore R ≥ RS (C), as in equations (2) and (SIR).
The expected profit from running a fragile bank is
πF (C,R) ≡
1
2
¡
R+ B¯ − (1− C)
¢
− 1
2
ζ − C (1 + κ) = 1
2
¡
R+ B¯ − ζ − 1− C (1 + 2κ)
¢
, (5)
which yields the following individual rationality constraint for fragile banking:
R ≥ RF (C) ≡ 1 + ζ − B¯ + C (1 + 2κ) . (FIR)
The banker will prefer fragile to sound banking precisely when πF −πS > 0: equivalently, when
R < B¯ + 1− C − ζ. (6)
Note that equation (6) implies equation (4) and hence it is both a necessary and a suﬃcient
condition for the banker to run a fragile bank. In other words, whenever the bank prefers to invest
in a risky project, it prefers investment to non-investment.
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The bank’s choice is summarized in figure 3, which shows for diﬀerent combinations of the
expected project return R and the regulator’s choice of C how the bank will resolve its moral
hazard problem. For (C,R) pairs below the lines labelled FIR and SIR the bank will choose not to
invest. Above these lines, investment will occur. In region F the bank plays risky and is fragile.
The bank is sound in region S.7
The intuition behind this figure is straightforward. Since risk-taking is not reflected in the cost
of funds, highly leveraged banks have a strong incentive to incur more risk. Nevertheless, if the
bank is suﬃciently fortunate to possess a project with a high expected return R, selecting the risky
project (B = B¯) jeopardizes the return: hence, for suﬃciently high R, the banker will select the safe
project (B = 0). The critical level of return above which safe projects are preferred is increasing
in the bank’s leverage (see equation 6).
As the bank receives an implicit subsidy from the deposit insurance fund, it has an incentive
to invest even when confronted with project whose present value net of the total cost 1 + Cκ of
investment is negative. Since the subsidy is decreasing in the bank’s capital exposure C, there will
be a point at which the subsidy is insuﬃcient to compensate for the risk of capital loss: this is
the point (C = B¯−ζ1+κ ) in figure 3 at which SIR and FIR cross. For C to the right of this point,
investment occurs only in safe projects whose return exceeds the total cost of funds, 1 + Cκ.
Our analysis of bank behaviour as a function of the capital requirement C enables us to deter-
mine the optimal capital requirement.
The following proposition characterizes the optimal capital requirements for a standalone bank.
Proposition 2 When regulating a standalone bank the optimal capital requirement C∗ is given by
C∗ =
(
C∗F , φ < φ¯;
C∗S, φ ≥ φ¯,
where C∗F , C
∗
S and φ¯ are given by equations (7), (8) and (9) respectively.
C∗F ≡
B¯ − ζ
1 + 2κ
+ φ
1 + κ
(1 + 2κ)2
; (7)
C∗S ≡
B¯ − ζ
1 + κ
; (8)
φ¯ ≡ κ (1 + 2κ)
(1 + κ)2
¡
B¯ − ζ
¢
. (9)
In the case where C∗ = C∗F the regulator chooses optimally to introduce financial fragility; in the
case where C∗ = C∗S the regulator sets capital at precisely the minimum level to wipe out systemic
risk.
Proof. See the appendix. 2
The optimality of financial fragility is somewhat surprising. Setting capital at a suﬃciently low
level to encourage risk-shifting may actually increase welfare because the over-investment induced
7Note that for high values of R playing safe is not a necessary condition for soundness.
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R
C
F
S Welfare = R-1
Welfare = R-1-φ/2
hR
B+ζ−1
( )
κ+
ζ−+κ+
1
11 B
1
B−ζ+1
lR
0
κ+
ζ−
1
B
ζ−
−+
=
C
B
R
1
( )κ++−ζ+=
21
1
:
FIR
C
B
R
κ+= CR 1:SIR
Figure 3: Stand alone banks: IR constraints and welfare.
by deposit insurance serves to counteract the under-investment associated with costly capital re-
quirements. This eﬀect outweighs the social costs of bank failure for suﬃciently small φ. In fact, we
demonstrate in the appendix (equation (11)) that when φ = 0, the welfare WF with fragile banks
is equal to the socially first best level. In this case, the capital requirement is optimally set so as
ensure that over- and under- investment incentives cancel out and RF (C) = 1; for higher values of
φ, the marginal cost in terms of lost revenue from small increases beyond this level of the capital
requirement are outweighed by the social benefit in terms of reduced bankruptcy probability and
so the (constrained) optimal hurdle rate exceeds 1.
Finally, note that equations (7) and (8) imply that capital adequacy requirements and charter
value ζ are substitutes. We discuss the relevance of this observation for competition policy in
section 5, which is devoted to policy implications.
3. Financial Conglomerates
We now analyze the optimal capital regulation of a financial conglomerate, which we define to
be an intermediary which is created by combining an MFI with a DFI. We consider two types of
conglomerate: holding-company conglomerates, and integrated conglomerates. Holding-company
conglomerates consist of a separately capitalized DFI and MFI, both owned by an umbrella corpo-
ration. Hence the capital requirements for the DFI and the MFI in a holding company conglomerate
10
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can be diﬀerent and the two divisions of the conglomerate could fail independently of one another.
Moreover, the two divisions of a holding company conglomerate could in principle trade projects
with one another in order to take advantage of diﬀerences in their respective capital regimes. We
refer to this type of trade as “regulatory arbitrage.”
Integrated conglomerates consist of a DFI and an MFI with a single balance sheet. They
therefore have a single regulatory capital requirement. The DFI and the MFI in an integrated
conglomerate cannot fail independently. Hence, diversification eﬀects in integrated conglomerates
may serve to diminish the likelihood of failure and hence of the associated systemic costs. However,
as we will show, under some circumstances integration may serve to widen the coverage of the
deposit insurance safety net and hence to introduce socially costly risk-shifting in the conglomerate.
We assume that the conglomerate’s charter value is again ζ and that the systemic cost of failure
is φ per division. Note that this implies that the total systemic cost of conglomerate failure is 2φ.
The game which we analyze is illustrated in figure 4.
Regulator
announces 
capital
requirement
C
Nature
reveals
expected
project return,
RD, RM
If investment
occurs,
intermediary
selects riskiness
BD, BM ∈{0,B}
Possible 
opportunity
for trade.
Fund-raising
occurs.
Returns
realise
time 0 time 1 time 2 time 3 time 4
Figure 4: Time line for conglomerates.
At time 0 the regulator announces the capital requirement C. At time 1 nature presents the
DFI and the MFI with projects each of which requires an investment of $1 and whose expected
returns are RD and RM respectively: RD and RM are independent draws of a random variable R˜
which is uniformly distributed on [Rl, Rh]. At time 2 the conglomerate decides whether or not to
invest in the projects, and selects their risk levels BD and BM as in section 2. At time 3 funds are
raised, and a holding-company conglomerate has an opportunity for the MFI and the DFI to trade
projects. Returns are realized and distributed at time 4.
3.1. Holding-Company Conglomerates
In this section we determine the optimal capital requirements C∗HD and C
∗
HM for holding company
conglomerate divisions. As in section 2.2 the regulator is constrained to condition capital require-
ments only upon verifiable data so that the optimal capital requirement will be 0 for a completely
cash collateralized division, and will otherwise be risk-insensitive.
Without inter-division trade the conclusions of this section would be identical to those of sections
2.1 and 2.2. Our results are therefore driven by the eﬀects of regulatory arbitrage. We assume that
within the conglomerate there is perfect information and hence that inter-division trade is neither
impaired by informational asymmetry, nor driven by profit/loss transfers across divisions. When
11
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one of the divisions sells its investment to the other, it does so for a price of $18 and its investments
are then cash-collateralised, in which case its capital requirement will be zero.
Suppose now that a DFI is presented with an expected return which is too low for it to retain,
but which would be profitable for an MFI. The above argument implies that the DFI will accept
the investment and will finance it entirely through deposit-taking. It will then sell the project to
the MFI division for $1. The DFI’s depositors will then be entirely cash-collateralised so that its
capital requirement will be satisfied. The MFI will finance its purchase of the project using capital
CHM and bonds to the value 1− CHM .
Regulatory arbitrage will increase welfare if it serves to discourage financial fragility. Since only
DFIs will ever choose to be fragile, the optimal capital regime will make it more attractive to play
safe and then to sell projects to the MFI than to retain them and to play risky. With respective
capital requirements CHM and CHD for the MFI and the DFI, this will be the case precisely when
πF (CHD) < πS (CHM ), or
CHD ≥
1
1 + 2κ
©
B¯ − ζ + 1−Rl + 2CHMκ
ª
.
When this condition is satisfied the DFI will invest in any project whose expected return exceeds
RS (CHM ). It will always play safe and it will sell its project to the MFI.
Since the MFI will always be sound and will invest in any project whose return exceeds 1 +
CHM (1 + κ), the following result is immediate:
Proposition 3 The respective optimal capital requirements for the market- and deposit- financed
divisions of a holding-company financial conglomerate are as follows:
C∗HM = 0;
C∗HD =
1
1 + 2κ
©
B¯ − ζ + 1−Rl
ª
.
This will achieve the first-best outcome: both divisions will invest in any project for which R ≥ 1
and both will be sound. The MFI will retain all of its projects; the DFI will sell its projects to the
MFI.
Recall that with non-zero social costs φ of failure, the best we can do is deliberately to introduce
some underinvestment, and when φ < φ¯ also some fragility, into a standalone DFI. Proposition 3
therefore demonstrates that by achieving the first best, capital arbitrage in a decentralized con-
glomerate is welfare-improving. The intuition for our result follows from a proper understanding of
the purpose of capital regulation: it is intended to force financial intermediaries to internalize the
[it is not only systemic] costs of actions which they would otherwise ignore. When these actions
are already internalized, as they are in the case of an MFI, further capital regulation serves only
to impede the intermediary’s eﬃcient operation. Hence a regime which encourages the divisions
of a holding company conglomerate to hold their investments in the division which suﬀers from the
lowest systemic externalities will raise welfare.
8This is a statement about the division of surplus. It simplifies the algebra but is not necessary for our conclusions.
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This goes against the grain of many of the assumptions (implicit and explicit) in regulatory
discussions. These tend to focus on concerns that conglomerates will use regulatory arbitrage to
shift poor investments into DFIs and so transfer their expected losses to the deposit insurance fund.
We have shown that this is only worth doing under a poorly designed capital adequacy regime.
When capital requirements are set optimally, this type of regulatory arbitrage will cost more than
it is worth. Capital requirements for holding-company DFIs are therefore set significantly above
those for standalone DFIs precisely in order to encourage regulatory arbitrage.
Finally, we note that the prediction in proposition 3 that DFIs sell all of their loan assets
is in reality rather extreme. Banks are sometimes prohibited by the terms of their customer
agreements from selling their loans and hence would in practice retain some assets. Incorporating
this requirement into out model might serve to reduce somewhat the optimal capital requirement
C∗HD, but it would not materially aﬀect our results.
3.2. Integrated Conglomerates
Integrated conglomerates have a single balance sheet and so cannot engage in regulatory arbitrage.
In an integrated conglomerate there is no particular reason in our model why any funds should
be raised from depositors. There are however clear social reasons why deposit-taking will continue
to occur and we therefore assume that the funds which the conglomerate needs for investment are
raised in equal proportions from depositors and from bond-holders.
Integrated conglomerates can make two, one, or no investments. We start by analyzing the
conglomerates with two investments. We define R˜ ≡ R˜M + R˜D to be the total expected return
from the two projects which the conglomerate runs. Let
β ≡ BM +BD (10)
be the total riskiness of the conglomerate. Then we consider three cases: β = 2B¯, B¯, 0, according to
whether the conglomerate plays risky with two, one, or no projects. When β = B¯ the conglomerate
can return in a high or a low state, each with probability 12 : in this case we will refer to the
conglomerate as undiversified. When β = 2B¯ we say that the conglomerate is diversified. Diversified
conglomerates return high (R+2B¯), middle (R) or low (R−2B¯) payouts with respective probabilities
1
4 ,
1
2 , or
1
4 . In a diversified conglomerate the returns on a failing project may be cancelled by
those on a successful one. However, in case of bankruptcy, a diversified institution may generate
higher expected deposit insurance payouts than an undiversified conglomerate. This is because low
state returns for diversified conglomerates (R− 2B¯) are below those of undiversified conglomerates
(R− B¯), and this raises the threshold R value below which the deposit insurance fund pays out.
We summarize the properties of integrated conglomerates in proposition 4:
Proposition 4 Every integrated conglomerate with two investments is diversified and fragile (β =
2B¯) or risk-free (β = 0).
Proof. See the appendix. 2
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Figure 5: Consolidated conglomerate investment strategies. The manager’s participation
constraint is indicated by the bold line. In the region where β = 2B¯ the conglomerate is diversified
and it is fragile; below the line R = 7 (1− C) /3 it fails when it returns R or R − 2B¯; above this
line it fails when it returns R− 2B¯. In the region β = 0 the conglomerate is sound.
Proposition 4 is illustrated in figure 5, which shows the IR constraints for investment, and
the sound and fragile regions. The choice between diversified and undiversified conglomerates is
driven by a trade-oﬀ between deposit insurance safety net payments and the loss of charter value
if the conglomerate defaults on its bond debt. We demonstrate in the appendix that in situations
where charter value outweighs the benefits of deposit insurance payouts, the expected return from
investment is too low to satisfy the manager’s participation constraint.
Along the line R = 7 (1−C) /3, figure 5 illustrates a discontinuity in the boundary between the
fragile and sound regions. Below this line diversified conglomerates default on bonds in the middle
and low states, while above it they default only in the low state. This aﬀects the expected loss of
charter value and explains the discontinuity.
The conglomerate plays safe (β = 0) when playing risky (β = 2B) does not generate a suﬃcient
deposit insurance payout to cover the expected loss of charter value.
Proposition 3 shows that first best levels of investment can be achieved without systemic risk
in the holding company and so we have:
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Corollary 1 From a welfare perspective, the holding company conglomerate structure weakly dom-
inates the integrated structure.
In other words, once capital requirements are properly set, holding companies are a better way
to structure conglomerates. This result clearly has important policy implications.
We now turn to a second, related question: should integrated financial conglomerates receive a
lower regulatory capital allocation than standalone DFIs by virtue of their risk diversification? To
answer this question we must consider both the diversification eﬀect and also the possibility that
integration might increase systemic risk by inducing additional risk-taking by the MFI. This latter
possibility has never been properly considered in the debate on conglomerate regulation.
It is not a priori clear whether the diversification or the risk-shifting eﬀects of integration
dominate, although corollary 1 indicates that the best way to deal with the problem is to im-
pose a holding-company structure upon financial conglomerates. The optimal capital requirement
calculation for integrated financial conglomerates proves in our model to be intractable. To demon-
strate that the risk-shifting eﬀect can bite we provide a simple illustrative example in which any
stand-alone institution would be sound, while an integrated conglomerate need not be.
Suppose that φ ≥ φ¯ so that (proposition 2) the optimal standalone capital requirement for a
DFI would be C∗S and hence the DFI would always be sound. Note (proposition 1) that the MFI
would hold optimal capital of 0 and that it would always be sound. Consider the investment choices
of an integrated conglomerate whose total capital requirement is 0+C∗S = C
∗
S. This reflects current
legislation: the consensus amongst practitioners is that the diversified integrated conglomerate
should attract a lower capital requirement. Note that in our formula the total capital requirement
for the integrated conglomerate is 2C and hence that in our example, C = 12C
∗
S.
Lemma 1 If φ ≥ φ¯ then precisely when B¯ > 23+ζ, there is a non-empty range of R values for which
a two project integrated conglomerate with capital requirement 12C
∗
S will be diversified (β = 2B¯) and
fragile.
Proof. See the appendix. 2
For φ ≥ φ¯, separately capitalized conglomerate divisions would be sound; the MFI is always
charged for its risk-bearing, and we proved in section 2 that with capital requirement C∗S the DFI
will be unable to assume a suﬃciently large risk to draw upon the deposit insurance fund. When
the two institutions are integrated and take total risk 2B¯, the conglomerate’s bond-holders will
continue to charge for the risk which they assume. However, for large enough B¯, failure is suﬃcient
to trigger a claim on the deposit insurance fund for which the conglomerate will make no marginal
payment. When the expected value of the claim is suﬃciently large to compensate for the expected
loss of charter value the conglomerate will choose to be fragile.
This result illustrates our point: holding capital requirements constant as integrated conglom-
erates form can result in an increased probability of failure. Hence, contrary to received opinion
in the market, when the systemic cost φ of failure is suﬃciently large capital requirements for
integrated conglomerates should exceed the sum of their component stand-alone requirements.
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Proposition 4 and lemma 1 discuss the properties of two project conglomerates. Lemma
2,guarantees their existence.
Lemma 2 Integrated conglomerates accept all positive NPV projects. They also accept some nega-
tive NPV projects.
Proof. See the appendix. 2
Lemma 2 proves that the fragile region of figure 5 is non-empty. Within this region integrated
conglomerates take risks with two projects in order to generate an expected deposit insurance
payout. If the conglomerate has a single project whose return falls within this region, it is worth
accepting a small loss on a second, risky, project in exchange for the deposit insurance subsidy
which it generates.
Note that the IR constraints are increasing in the charter value ζ and decreasing in project
riskiness B¯, while these parameters have the opposite eﬀect upon the upper bound 1+2B¯− ζ −C.
Hence:
Lemma 3 For a given capital requirement, the probability that an integrated conglomerate will fail
is increasing in the maximum investment riskiness B¯ and decreasing in the charter value ζ.
As in previous sections it follows that ζ, which may be interpreted as charter value, substitutes
for financial capital.
4. Extensions
In this section we explore the robustness of our model by considering a number of possible extensions
that result from relaxing some of our simplifying assumptions.
4.1. Market Discipline
Our formal analysis assumes perfect market discipline for the market financed institution and no
discipline for the depository institution. We discuss relaxations of these assumptions below.
First, market monitoring is in practice costly with the consequence that monitoring incentives
vanish for institutions which are in equilibrium sound. Hence a mixed strategy equilibrium in
monitoring and gambling will emerge (Grossman and Stigltz, 1980). This attenuates the eﬀects of
market discipline. Our conclusions carry over, but the benefits of regulatory arbitrage are reduced.
Second, in practice more sophisticated regulation may induce information revelation by informed
bankers. This is the goal of the internal models approach of the second Basle Accord (2004). To the
extent that this is successful, it reduces the benefits of a holding company structure with regulatory
arbitrage. Such arbitrage is at worst welfare neutral, however, and so our conclusions are (weakly)
unaﬀected by this observation.
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4.2. Costly Asset Transfers
We assume in our model that transferring assets between divisions is costless. In practice, there may
be costs: in particular, suppose that banks are endowed with monitoring skills which are absent in
market-financed institutions (Diamond and Rajan, 2001). This introduces two costs, which must
be weighed against the benefits of improved market discipline and potentially lower social costs of
failure. Firstly, assets which are transferred will be less eﬀectively monitored. Secondly, setting
capital requirements suﬃciently high to induce regulatory arbitrage will raise the hurdle rate for
informationally opaque projects which it is not profitable to transfer. Both of these eﬀects will
serve to diminish the optimal capital requirement for depository institutions. The development of
securitization techniques which allow for risk but not monitoring responsibility to be transferred
will attenuate the eﬀects examined in this paragraph.
4.3. Social Costs of Failure
Our analysis is predicated upon the assumption that the social cost φ of institutional failure is
the same for deposit- and market-financed intermediaries. However, a number of authors have
argued that the systemic costs of bank failure are significantly higher than those of insurance or
security company failure: bank failure may give rise to contagion; bank failure aﬀects the payments
system; and bank failure may cause the loss of valuable informational assets. These eﬀects serves
to strengthen our conclusions. We have based our argument entirely upon the endogeneity of
bank risk-taking and the risk-insensitivity of bank finance. However, our conclusion that a holding
company structure is optimal when allowing for regulatory arbitrage could equally be derived in
the absence of these eﬀects, provided the social cost of bank failure exceeds that of market-financed
institutions. With this assumption, as capital requirements force the internalisation of systemic
externalities, they will optimally be higher for banks than for market-financed intermediaries. As
a result, the bank’s hurdle rate will exceed the market-financed intermediary’s. Thus, regulatory
arbitrage will again lower the eﬀective cost of bank investment and hence will raise welfare.
4.4. Bank Conglomerates
We can use our approach to analyse related questions regarding conglomerate regulation. Of
particular relevance are conglomerates formed from two banking divisions. Since the adoption of
the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) in 1989, bank holding
companies in the United States have been subject to the Federal Reserve’s “source of strength”
doctrine, which forces the holding company or another division within the holding to bear any costs
incurred by the deposit insurance company in the wake of divisional failure.9 Any bank holding
company that is unwilling or unable to bear the costs will be deemed “unsafe and unsound” and
therefore the Federal Reserve Board will force its closure. This regulation was originally intended
to discourage ex post loss concentration in distressed divisions in order to maximise the value of
the deposit insurance option (see footnote 4).
9Ashcraft (2004) shows that in the US a bank aﬃliated with a multi-holding company is significantly safer than
either a standalone bank or one aﬃliate with a one-bank holding.
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The source of strength doctrine prevents one bank division from walking away from the other in
the event of its failure. Hence it forces integration in bank conglomerates. We have demonstrated
that such forced integration would be socially sub-optimal in conglomerates containing a non-
bank division, as it would prevent risk concentration in the division subject to the most market
discipline and the lowest social failure cost. However, these eﬀects are constant across the divisions
of a bank conglomerate and hence the above argument does not apply. On the contrary, the source
of strength legislation ensures that banks internalise as much as possible of the risk which they take.
Notwithstanding this observation, a similar argument to that underlying proposition 4 implies that
an integrated bank conglomerate may take more risk than any of its constituents would have done
on a stand alone basis. The reason is that, when each division is able to bail out the others, a
greater degree of risk is required to profit from the deposit insurance put option. If the source-of-
strength doctrine simply incentivises the holding company to take more risks then it generates no
eﬃciency gains.
If instead liability were limited by the requirement that the failure of one division could not
trigger the failure of the other, access to the deposit insurance net would be diminished, and with
it risk-shifting incentives. This would clearly be desirable. Even with this alteration, though, the
source of strength doctrine fails to account for the substitutability of capital regulation and market
discipline (i.e., of pillars one and three of the new Basle Accord). We have argued that capital
requirements should optimally counter the increased risk-shifting incentives engendered by deposit
insurance. As a consequence, when these incentives are ameliorated, capital requirements should
be reduced. Since a successful source of strength doctrine would reduce the value to a bank holding
company of the deposit insurance put option, it would increase market discipline and hence reduce
risk-shifting incentives. Hence, for source of strength legislation to increase eﬃciency it should be
accompanied by correspondingly looser capital requirements.10
In summary, our framework indicates the potential for eﬃciency gains from source-of-strength
type regulations, but also demonstrates that these gains are currently not fully realised for two
reasons. First, a division may take larger risks so that its failure triggers the failure of the other
and hence maintains its access to the deposit insurance put option. Second, to the extent that
source-of-strength regulations succeed in increasing market discipline, they should be accompanied
by a downward adjustment in capital requirements.
5. Policy Implications
5.1. Level Playing Field
Since capital is costly, an essential precursor to fair competition in the financial sector is that no
institution should be placed at a relative disadvantage by capital regulation. This is the basis of the
Basle Accord’s emphasis upon a “level playing field” (see Basle Committee on Banking Supervision,
1997). A commonly deployed argument in favour of integrated conglomerates is that they reduce
systemic risk by diversifying risks across banks and insurance companies. This observation has
been used to argue that a level playing field will allocate lower capital requirements to an integrated
10A similar eﬀect obtains in branch-organised multinational banks: see Lóránth and Morrison (2003).
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conglomerate than to either a holding company conglomerate, or the corresponding standalone
institutions.
Provided asset riskiness is exogenous, this argument is perfectly correct. Our model highlights an
additional eﬀect that has received less attention: namely, that by extending the reach of the deposit
insurance net to the conglomerate’s MFI, integration may actually introduce additional risk-taking
incentives and hence increase systemic risk. Lemma 1 demonstrates that for certain parameter
values, the second of these eﬀects dominates the first. When this happens, level playing fields
actually require integrated conglomerate capital requirements to exceed those of the corresponding
standalone institutions.
It has been acknowledged for some years that charter value forces banks to internalise their
costs of failure and hence discourages excessive risk-taking.11 As a result of this eﬀect, charter
value and capital are substitutes (in our model, see propositions 2 and 3). Lemma 1 establishes
a new eﬀect: it demonstrates that optimal integrated conglomerate capital requirements exceed
standalone requirements for suﬃciently low charter value. In other words, diversification alone is
not enough to reduce capital requirements.
5.2. Pro-Cyclicality
A frequently voiced criticism of the new Basle Accord on capital regulation is that it may serve to
amplify the economic cycle. As far as we are aware, pro-cyclicality has not featured in discussions
of financial conglomeration. In this section we suggest that it may be a concern in integrated
conglomerates.
The most important MFIs in financial conglomerates are insurance companies, whose assets are
market securities. As such, their investments have the same expected return as the market. In
contrast, DFIs hold customer loans which have distinct return characteristics.12
In the light of the observations in the previous paragraph, we consider a variation of our model
in which MFI returns are equal to those on the market and the DFI makes its investment decisions
with a knowledge of the expected market return RM . When the sum of RM and the expected DFI
return lies in region F of figure 5 the integrated conglomerate will be fragile. For a given DFI
return distribution, the probability that this occurs is clearly decreasing in RM .
During an economic slowdown, the maximum investment riskiness B¯ increases, bank charter
value ζ decreases and the expected market return RM to MFI portfolios drops. Lemma 3 shows
that the first two eﬀects will cause an increase in the size of region F in figure 5. This translates
into an increased probability that the integrated conglomerate is fragile.
In summary, poor expected market returns increase the conglomerate’s incentive to play risky
and hence exacerbate systemic pressures already in the economy. The endogeneity of risk selection
therefore reverses the standard assumption that diversification has a stabilizing eﬀect in economic
downturns. Conversely, the size of the fragile region is smaller for high expected market returns
and the probability that the total conglomerate return lies within it is also reduced.
11The initial paper on this topic was Keeley (1990).
12Although loan portfolio returns are correlated with the market, there is some evidence that bank loans have less
systematic risk than securities and insurance company portfolios: see Allen and Jagtiani (2000).
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6. Conclusion
In this paper we present a model of financial intermediation in which capital requirements serve
to force shareholders to internalize failure and deposit insurance costs which they would otherwise
ignore. Our basic intuition is that risk-taking incentives are endogenous and depend upon the
extent to which a financial institution is subject to market discipline. When market discipline
is weak, as in a depository institution whose depositors are protected by deposit insurance, the
institution will tend to take socially excessive risks. In this case, regulatory capital requirements
serve as a costly substitute for market discipline: optimal regulation trades oﬀ their costs against
their disciplining eﬀects. Hence, our results suggest that pillars one and three of the new Basle
Accord are (partial) substitutes.
Integrated conglomerates are diversified and hence may better internalise the risks which they
assume. However, they are partially financed by risk-insensitive deposits and this undermines the
market discipline of their non-bank division, which may as a result assume larger risks. When
the second eﬀect out weighs the first, they will be relatively less eﬃcient than the sum of their
standalone parts, and they should be subject to a higher aggregate capital adequacy requirement.
In contrast, we find that the ability to set separate capital requirements for each of the divisions
of a holding-company conglomerate allows the regulator to induce first-best investment behaviour
by the conglomerate. This is because the regulator can set capital requirements to reflect the
riskiness of each division and hence can encourage the conglomerate to hold assets in the most
eﬃcient location. Hence, our results rest upon the existence of regulatory arbitrage, which in our
set-up is unambiguously welfare-increasing.
Although our formal analysis examines a conglomerate containing a bank and a non-bank
institution, our framework allows us to comment upon the Federal Reserve’s “source of strength”
doctrine, which forces the holding company or another division within the holding to bear any costs
incurred by the deposit insurance company in the wake of divisional failure. In line with our results
on integrated conglomerates, we argue that this regulation may actually serve to increase bank
risk-taking incentives. Moreover, to the extent that it succeeds in enhancing market discipline, it
should be accompanied by reduced capital requirements.
Finally, we find that the incentive for excessive risk-taking in an integrated conglomerate is
greatest when the total expected returns of its divisions is lowest. Hence, in bank and insurance
conglomerates, to the extent that the insurance company portfolio tracks the market, the probability
of risk-shifting is greatest in economic downturns. Hence, integrated conglomerates may invest so
as to amplify the economic cycle.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
Recall that welfare is defined to be the total surplus generated by the bank, net of any social costs.
Hence, a sound bank generates welfare R − 1 and a fragile one generates welfare R − 1 − φ2 . The
regulator’s job is to select C so as to maximize expected welfare:
C∗ ∈ argmax
C
W (C) ,
where for a given C, W (C) is the expected welfare:
W (C) ≡
Z Rh
Rl
1
∆
ω (C,R) dR,
and the project welfare function ω (C,R) is as indicated in figure 3:
ω (C,R) ≡
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
R− 1, R > max
¡
B¯ + 1− C − ζ,RS
¢
;
R− 1− φ2 , RF < R ≤ B¯ + 1−C − ζ;
0, R ≤ min (RS , RF ) .
Straightforward calculations yield
W (C) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1
2∆
n
(Rh − 1)2 −
¡
ζ − B¯ + C (1 + 2κ)
¢2o− φ∆ ¡B¯ − ζ −C (1 + κ)¢ , C < C∗S;
1
2∆
n
(Rh − 1)2 − (Cκ)2
o
, C ≥ C∗S,
where C∗S is defined in equation (8).
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To find C∗, note firstly that
lim
C↑C∗S
W (C) = lim
C↓C∗S
W (C) =
1
2∆
n
(Rh − 1)2 − (Cκ)2
o
,
so W (.) is a continuous function on <≥0. Moreover, W (.) is trivially decreasing for C > C∗S . This
is intuitively as well as mathematically obvious: since banks are always sound when C > B¯−ζ1+κ ,
increasing C beyond C∗S serves simply to increase underinvestment.
For C < C∗S increasing C has two eﬀects. Firstly, the fragile region F within which the bank
assumes systemic risk shrinks. This serves unambiguously to raise welfare. Secondly, the capital
costs Cκ of investing and hence the hurdle rate FIR increase. This increases welfare provided
FIR < 1 so that risk shifting is causing overinvestment; conversely, it decreases welfare if FIR > 1,
in which case high capital costs are already causing underinvestment.
When C < C∗S, W
0 (C) = 0 when C = C∗F , defined in equation (7). Note that C
∗
F > 0 and
that C∗F < C
∗
S whenever φ < φ¯, defined in equation (9): when this is the case, it follows because
W (C) is concave, continuous at C∗S and decreasing for C > C
∗
S that the regulator will set C = C
∗
F .
Expected welfare is then given by
WF ≡W (C∗F ) =
1
2∆
(Rh − 1)2 −
φ
2∆ (1 + 2κ)2
n
2
¡
B¯ − ζ
¢
κ (1 + 2κ)− φ (1 + κ)2
o
. (11)
If φ > φ¯ then C∗F > C
∗
S : W (C) is then strictly increasing for C < C
∗
S and strictly decreasing for
C > C∗S . The regulator will therefore set C = C
∗
S .
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof proceeds as follows. Firstly, we derive the expected profits of diversified and undiversified
conglomerates as functions of (C,R). Secondly, we identify (C,R) values for which diversified
conglomerates outperform undiversified conglomerates, and then we identify (C,R) values for which
playing safe dominates either strategy. Finally, we compare the manager’s IR constraint for each
region with its upper bound and so derive a feasible investment region.
Diversified Conglomerates. It is convenient to define the regions F1, F2, F3, F4, and F5 as
follows:
F1 = {(C,R) : R < 1−C}
F2 =
©
(C,R) : 1− C ≤ R < min
¡
2B¯ + 1− C, 1− C + ρ
¢ª
F3 =
©
(C,R) : 2B¯ + 1− C ≤ R < 1− C + ρ
ª
F4 =
©
(C,R) : 1− C + ρ ≤ R < min
¡
2B¯ + (1− C) , 1− C + ρ+ 2B¯
¢ª
F5 =
©
(C,R) : max
¡
1− C + ρ, 2B¯ + (1− C)
¢
≤ R < 1− C + ρ+ 2B¯
ª
The regions are illustrates in figure 6. They divide the plane according to the expected deposit
insurance payouts and the expected costs of charter value loss.
When (C,R) ∈ F1 the conglomerate fails in the middle and low states and in neither of these
states will the bond-holders receive a payment.
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Figure 6: Fragile and sound regions in consolidated conglomerates with β = 2B¯. Note that region
F3 vanishes when B¯ ≥ 23 .
When (C,R) ∈ F2 or (C,R) ∈ F4, the conglomerate fails in the low state and the bond-holders
will in this case receive nothing so that the conglomerate receives a deposit insurance fund subsidy.
The conglomerate fails in the middle state only when (C,R) ∈ F2, but in this case the bond-holders
are partially repaid and so there is no deposit insurance payout. Hence regions F2 and F4 are
distinguished only by the additional expected loss of charter value in region F2.
When (C,R) ∈ F3 or (C,R) ∈ F5, no default is so large that the bond holders receive no payment
and hence the conglomerate never draws upon the deposit insurance fund. In both regions default
occurs in the bottom state; in the middle state it occurs only in region F3. One again therefore the
two regions are distinguished only by their respective expected charter values.
The expected profit of the conglomerate in region F1 is
πF1 ≡ {R− 2 (1 +Cκ)}− 3
4
ζ +
½
1
2
(1− C −R) + 1
4
¡
1− C −R+ 2B¯
¢¾
.
The first curly bracketed expression is the expected conglomerate profit in a world with perfect
information and no externalities. The second term is the expected loss of charter value. The third
is the expected value of the deposit insurance subsidy.
Similarly, the expected profits of the conglomerate in regions F2, F3, F4 and F5 are given by
the following expressions:
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πF2 ≡ R− 2 (1 + Cκ)−
3
4
ζ +
1
4
¡
1− C −R+ 2B¯
¢
;
πF3 ≡ R− 2 (1 + Cκ)−
3
4
ζ;
πF4 ≡ −2 (1 + Cκ)−
1
4
ζ +
1
4
¡
1−C −R+ 2B¯
¢
;
πF5 ≡ R− 2 (1 + Cκ)−
1
4
ζ.
Undiversified Conglomerates. Analogously with the diversified case, we define regions Fˆ1 and
Fˆ2 as follows:
Fˆ1 ≡
©
(C,R) : R < B¯ + 1− C
ª
Fˆ2 ≡
©
(C,R) : B¯ + 1−C ≤ R < B¯ + 1− C + ρ
ª
Regions Fˆ1 and Fˆ2 are illustrated in figure 7.
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Figure 7: Fragile and sound regions in consolidated conglomerates with β = B¯.
For (C,R) ∈ Fˆ1 the bond-holders receive nothing if the conglomerate fails and hence the
conglomerate receives a deposit insurance fund payout, while for (C,R) ∈ Fˆ2 the bond-holders
25
REGULATION OF FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES
receive a payment in the event of conglomerate failure and there is therefore no deposit insurance
payment.
The expected profits from running an undiversified conglomerate in regions Fˆ1 and Fˆ2 are as
follows:
πˆF1 ≡ R− 2 (1 + Cκ)−
1
2
ζ +
1
2
¡
1− C −R+ B¯
¢
;
πˆF2 ≡ R− 2 (1 + Cκ)−
1
2
ζ.
The first two terms in these expressions are again the expected profits in a world without agency
eﬀects; the term involving ζ is the expected charter value loss and the last term in the expression
for πˆF1 is the expected deposit insurance fund payout.
Lemma 4 (Choosing Between Diversified and Undiversified Conglomerates) The con-
dition for an integrated conglomerate to prefer β = 2B¯ to β = B¯ depends upon the value of (C,R)
as follows:
1. In F1 ∩ Fˆ1 = {(C,R) : R ≤ 1− C},
1
4
(1− C −R) ≥ 1
4
ζ;
2. In F2 ∩ Fˆ1 =
©
(C,R) : 1− C < R ≤ min
¡
1− C + B¯, 73 (1− C)
¢ª
,
1
4
ζ ≤ 1
4
(R− (1− C)) ;
3. In F2 ∩ Fˆ2 =
©
(C,R) : 1− C < R ≤ min
¡
2B¯ + (1− C) , 73 (1−C)
¢ª
,
−1
4
ζ ≤ 1
4
¡
1−C −R+ 2B¯
¢
,
which is always true;
4. In F3 ∩ Fˆ2 =
©
(C,R) : 1− C + B¯ < R ≤ B¯ + 2 (1− C)
ª
, −34ζ ≥ −
1
2ζ, which is impossible;
5. In F4 ∩ Fˆ1 =
©
(C,R) : 73 (1− C) < R ≤ B¯ + (1− C)
ª
, 14ζ ≥
1
4 (1− C −R), which is always
true;
6. In F4 ∩ Fˆ2 =
©
(C,R) : B¯ + (1− C) ≤ R < 2B¯ + (1− C)
ª
, 14
¡
1−C −R+ 2B¯
¢
− 14ζ ≥ −
1
2ζ,
which is always true;
7. In F5 ∩ Fˆ2 =
©
(C,R) : B¯ + (1− C) ≤ R < 2B¯ + (1− C)
ª
, − ζ4 > −
1
2ζ, which is always true.
Proof. Trivial by manipulation of the expressions for πF and πˆF . 2
The intuition for this result is simple. When (C,R) ∈ F1, playing risky with two projects
increases the deposit insurance payout at the expense of greater expected charter value loss. This
is desirable only for suﬃciently low ζ.
When (C,R) ∈ F1∩ Fˆ1 the conglomerate receives a large deposit insurance payout with prob-
ability 14 if β = 2B¯. Setting β = B¯ yields a smaller deposit insurance payout with probability
1
2 .
The latter option is preferable for the former for suﬃciently low R; for R higher the latter option
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yields a better return in exchange for the expected drop in charter value. If instead (C,R) ∈ Fˆ2,
setting β = B¯ never generates a payout from the deposit insurance fund. In this the conglomerate
will clearly prefer to set β = 2B¯.
When (C,R) ∈ F3 ∩ Fˆ2, no value of β will generate a deposit insurance fund payment. The
conglomerate therefore prefers the value which minimizes expected charter value losses: in other
words, it sets β = B¯.
When (C,R) ∈ F4∩Fˆ1, the expected reduction in charter value with β = 2B¯ are unambiguously
lower than with β = B¯. Moreover, the deposit insurance subsidy is larger.
When (C,R) ∈ Fˆ2 there is no deposit insurance subsidy; the expected charter value losses in
F2 and F5 are lower for β = 2B¯ than for β = B¯ and the conglomerate will therefore elect to play
risky with two projects in
³
F4 ∩ Fˆ2
´
∪
³
F5 ∩ Fˆ2
´
.
Lemma 5 (The Decision to Take Risks) Running a sound conglomerate dominates running
either a diversified or an undiversified conglomerate precisely when condition (12) is satisfied:
(R < 7 (1− C) /3) and
¡
R > 1−C + 2B¯ − 3ζ
¢
;
OR
(R > 7 (1−C) /3) and
¡
R > 1− C + 2B¯ − ζ
¢
.
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
(12)
Proof. Note that there is no value to risk-taking when the consequential deposit insurance payout
will be zero. This is the case for undiversified conglomerates when (C,R) ∈ Fˆ2, and for diversified
conglomerates when (C,R) ∈ F3∪F5. Hence if (C,R) ∈
³
Fˆ2 ∩F3
´
∪
³
Fˆ2 ∩F5
´
, running a sound
conglomerate dominates either form of fragile conglomerate.
It remains to check when sound conglomerates are preferred in regions F1, F2 and F4. In F1 it
is easy to show that a suﬃcient condition for fragile conglomerates always to dominate sound ones
is
1− C −R+ B¯ > ζ.
We expect ζ to be small relative to the total losses B¯ from failure and we therefore assume that
this is the case. Finally, condition (12) follows from straightforward comparison of the expressions
for πF2, πF4 to the expected profits R− 2 (1 + Cκ) from running a sound conglomerate. 2
Lemma 6 Consider an integrated conglomerate with capital requirement C and define β as in equa-
tion (10) to be its total level of risk. If condition (12) of lemma 5 is satisfied then β = 0; if condition
(13) is satisfied then β = B¯; otherwise, β = 2B¯.
(1− C − ζ < R < 1− C + ζ) and (R < 7 (1− C) /3) . (13)
Proof. The lemma follows immediately from lemmas 4 and 5 2
Lemma 6 partitions the (C,R) space into five regions as illustrated in figure 8, according to
whether an integrated conglomerate with two projects returns the highest expected return when
diversified (β = 2B¯), undiversified (β = B¯), or safe (β = 0). We now investigate the manager’s
individual rationality constraints in each of these regions.
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Figure 8: Preferred risk levels for a two project consolidated conglomerate.
Lemma 7 (Manager’s Participation Constraints) In an integrated conglomerate with two
projects,
1. The manager’s IR constraint is violated whenever (C,R) lies in region I or II;
2. The manager’s IR constraint can be satisfied in region III if and only if
B¯ >
1
2
(1 + C + 3ζ + 2Cκ) ; (14)
3. The manager’s IR constraint can be satisfied in region IV if and only if
B¯ >
1
2
(1 + C + ζ + 2Cκ) . (15)
Proof. Setting πF1 and πˆF1 greater than or equal to zero yields the respective IR constraints for
regions I and II: R ≥ RF1 ≡ 5− 2B+3C+3 ζ +8C κ and R ≥ RFˆ1 ≡ 3−B+C+ ζ +4C κ. The
manager’s IR constraint can be satisfied in region I iﬀ RF1 ≤ 1−C− ζ iﬀ B > 2(1+C+ ζ+2Cκ),
which is impossible since B < 1. Similarly, the IR constraint is satisfiable in region II iﬀ RFˆ1 ≤
1 − C + ζ iﬀ B > 2 (1 + C) + 4Cκ, which is again impossible. The IR constraint in region III is
obtained by setting πF2 ≥ 0: R ≥ RF2 ≡ 13 (7− 2B +C + 3ζ + 8Cκ). It can be satisfied in region
III iﬀ RF2 ≤ 1 + 2B¯ − 3ζ − C from which condition (14) follows immediately. In region IV the
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IR constraint is obtained from π4: R ≥ RF4 ≡ 13 (7− 2B + C + ζ + 8Cζ). It can be satisfied iﬀ
RF4 ≤ 1 + 2B¯ − ζ − C which yields condition (15). 2
This concludes the proof of proposition 4.
Proof of Lemma 1
Inserting C = 12C
∗
S into equations (14) and (28) yields equations 16) and (17).
B¯ >
2
3
+
5
3
ζ; (16)
B¯ >
2
3
+ ζ. (17)
The relevant IR constraint is RF2 precisely when 12C
∗
S <
2B¯−3ζ
8(1+κ) , or B¯ <
ζ
2 (1− κ), which contradicts
condition (16). The IR constraint is RF4 iﬀ B¯ >
ζ
2 (3 + 2κ), which is implied by condition (17).
Proof of Lemma 2
The expected profit of a single project integrated conglomerate with return R is given by πˆF1 (C,R),
πˆF2 (C,R) or πS according to whether (C,R) lies in region F1, F2, or S of figure 7. It is easy to
check that profit is monotonically increasing in R. Accepting a second positive NPV project without
risk is equivalent to increasing the expected return on the first project: since taking risk is optional
the second project will be accepted. The proof that the firm accepts some negative NPV projects
appears in the text.
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